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Abstract
Schooling, an observable signal, decreases its impact on wages as employers “publicly”
learn workers’ true types from workers’ experience in the market. This symmetric em-
ployer learning hypothesis has been empirically questioned as, first, current and potential
employers in fact asymmetrically learn, and second, complementarity between school-
ing and work experience could enshroud learning effect. Microanalysis of Japanese steel
industry shows, 1) experience before entering the long-term employment is complemen-
tary to schooling, 2) employer learning effect dominates the complementarity effect after
workers’ joining the long-term employment. It suggests that previous evidences of em-
ployer learning have in fact captured internal labor market effect.
Key words: employer learning, schooling and wages, internal labor market effect.
JEL: J31, N35, J24.
*This research has been funded by the JSPS Grant-in-Aid (22243022) and the Mitsubishi Foundation.
†The author is thankful to support from the Kamaishi Iron Works, Nippon Steel Company. He also appreci-
ates helpful comments from Daiji Kawaguchi, Yuji Genda, Hideo Owan, Dan Bogart, Ryuichi Tanaka, Konosuke
Odaka, Takashi Kurosaki, Soohyung Lee, Norihito Abe, Chiaki Moriguchi, Kentaro Nakajima, Rasmus Lentz,
Gary Richardson, Peter Howlett, Janet Hunter, Keisuke Nakamura, Naofumi Nakamura, Michio Nitta, Junichiro
Ishida, Keiko Yoshida, and the participants of the Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organiza-
tions, the Contract Theory Workshop, and seminars at the University of Tokyo, London School of Economics
and Political Science, Free University of Berlin, University of Tu¨bingen, Hitotsubashi University, and University
of California, Irvine. Corresponding address: Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, Hongo 7-3-1,
103-0033 Tokyo, Japan. e-mail: mn@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp
1 Introduction
1.1 Total experience or tenure?: Employers’ asymmetric learning and
employees’ human capital investment
While human capital of individual workers are hard to observe, educational background is
one of observable proxies supposed to be correlated to skill and future performance. It en-
tices employers to statistically discriminate employees based on educational background, and
the statistical discrimination could lead to considerable gap between wages and realized per-
formance.1 Wage could grow either because human capital is invested in after employed or
because the employer learns employees’ ability endowed before employed, and it is generally
difficult to empirically distinguish them.2 Inspired by the screening hypothesis, rich empirical
results supporting “sheepskin effects” of schooling have been presented for the US and other
several economies.3 While there are evidences that schooling could enhance productivity, not
only work just as a signal, and the quality of education, not only diploma, does matter,4 it
does not necessarily contradict with screening hypothesis. Schooling works as a strong sig-
nal as well as increases productivity. It has been established that “sheepskin effects” exist in
someway in all of developed, developing, and even planed economies. Then the issue in the
literature has come to how the effects differ due to institutional arrangements, such as possible
discrimination of gender, ethnic, or racial minority, ownership structure of firm, or regime of
state.
“Employer learning” hypothesis focuses on how “sheepskin” effect decreases as employers
learn workers’ types. The founders of screening models had interests both in education as a
screening device itself and in social benefit of screening device to improve matching in the
job market. Focusing on the former and considering rich empirical results supporting it, the
1While the founders of “education as screening” hypothesis assumed education just as a screening device for
simplification, it could be extended such that education also enhances productivity. Spence (1973), pp. 358-368.
Arrow (1973), pp. 284-287. Tabman and Wales (1973), pp. 43-49. Stiglitz (1975), pp. 175-178. Spence (2002),
pp. 436-443.
2Stigler (1962), pp. 100-101.
3For the US, Riley (1979), pp.s240-s251, Lang and Kropp (1987), pp. 618-623, Hungerford and Solon
(1987), pp. 175-177, Belman and Heywood (1991), pp. 721-723, Heywood (1994), pp. 228-232, Jaeger and
Page (1996), pp. 734-738, Belman and Heywood (1997), pp. 628-635, Park (1999), pp. 238-240,Tyler, Murnane
and Willett (2000), pp. 445-447, Bedard (2001), pp. 760-774, Pinkston (2003), pp. 651-656, Bollinger and
Hirsch (2006), pp. 511-513, Trostel and Walker (2004), pp. 1965-1966, Clark and Jaeger (2006), pp. 772-788,
and Bitzan (2009), pp. 761-764. Hansen, Weisbrod and Scanlon (1970), pp. 411-416, also gives some evidences
that composed a part of screening hypothesis. For Japan, Bauer, Dross and Haisken-DeNew (2005), pp. 323-331.
For the UK, McGuinnes (2003), pp. 599-606, and Silles (2008), pp. 218-219. For Canada, Ferrer and Riddell
(2008), pp. 885-902, Ferrer and Riddell (2002), pp. 191-211, and Caponi and Plesca (2009), pp. 1113-1124. For
Spain, Pons and Blanco (2005), pp. 336-343, and Pons (2006), pp. 144-151. For Czech, a transition economy,
Mu¨nich, Svejnar and Terrell (2005a), pp. 104-119, and Mu¨nich, Svejnar and Terrell (2005b), pp. 280-293, which
examine differences over regimes, firm ownerships, and gender during the transition period. Denny and Harmon
(2001), p. 636, gives a quick comparison among the US, the UK, Canada, Ireland, and Sweden.
4Those evidences include Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974), pp. 989-992, Wolpin (1977), pp. 954-957.
Groot and Oosterbeek (1994), pp. 319-321, Card and Krueger (1992), pp. 31-36, for the US, Chevalier, Harmon,
Walker and Zhu (2004), pp. F505-516, for the UK, and Patrinos (1996), pp. 171-173, for Guatemala.
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employer learning model established by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret
(2001) provides a clear prediction that impact of schooling on wage decreases over workers’
experience in the labor market as employers “publicly” learn workers’ types hidden at the time
when they join the competitive labor market. This learning effect is in estimation practice
captured by non-increasing coefficient of the interaction term of schooling and experience in
a wage regression, and their empirical results support the prediction quite well, followed by
supporting works about the US labor market.5
At the same time, this symmetric version of employer learning hypothesis has been empir-
ically contested by mainly two strands.
The first one is reality of asymmetry in employer learning. A simple, but not negligible
feature of Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) is in that they do not
differentiate workers’ experience before and after entering long-term employment, hence im-
plicitly assume that learning goes through “publicly,” or, symmetrically between incumbent
employer and entrant employers, and that interaction between schooling and experience in
principle do not change before and after workers are successfully employed by a large firm
that commits to long-term employment. The symmetric learning assumption is questioned by
Pinkston (2009), which shows the US data in fact incumbent employers are learning better
than entrant employers.
The other issue discussed is about workers’ attitude to human capital investment. Non-
increasing coefficient of interaction term between schooling and experience implies not only
that the employer is learning but also that schooling and experience are not complements, or
their complementarity effect is sufficiently weak to be dominated by the employer learning
effect.6 If non-increasing coefficient of interaction between schooling and experience ob-
served, then complementarity between schooling and work experience is sufficiently weak,
which does not seem to always hold under technology-skill/education complementarity. In-
deed, Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001) showed that interaction term between schooling and
work experience has significantly positive coefficient for the German data set and concluded
that employer learning is not observed in the German labor market. While Lluis (2005) then
found some evidence of employer learning in the German data set, the effect of employer
learning seems to be weaker than that in the US. The extent of complementarity between
schooling and worker experience is largely affected by the extent of human capital specificity,
which is easily expected to be diverse over economies.
These two suggested questions indicate that the employer learning effect and the comple-
mentarity between general knowledge taught at schools and general human capital invested in
workplaces differ over economies and this could be a key of comparative analysis of the labor
market and the firm organization.
The employer learning model and suggested questions are, of course, not necessarily ex-
clusive to each other. Let us depict a possible life course of a worker.
As Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010) clearly demonstrates, based on a German data set,
young workers are expected to typically invest in “portable” general human capital as switch-
5Farber and Gibbons (1996), pp. 1010-1018. Altonji and Pierret (2001), pp. 316-323. Lange (2007), pp.
4-7. Oyer (2008), pp.278-287.
6Farber and Gibbons (1996), p. 1017.
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ing jobs several times in their early stages of career, and then enter employment of long-term
basis.7 Also in the US, especially when job changes are separated into voluntary ones and
involuntary ones, it is a typical phenomenon that younger male workers voluntarily switches
their jobs more frequently also in the US.8
Also, productivity of labor and education of worker are thought to be closely correlated
since the early 20th century, as industrial economies have experienced technology-skill/education
complementary development.9 Rather, educational background of workers has accordingly
emerged as the important proxy of ability in workplaces exactly on this context of technology-
skill/education complementarity.
Under the technology-skill/education complementary development, workers likely choose
work experiences to invest in general human capital complementary to their educational back-
ground before he/she joins a firm that commits to long-term employment and internal promo-
tion, i.e., internal labor market policy. Thus schooling and experience might be complements
in work experiences of short-term basis. This effect would work to make coefficient of in-
teraction term between schooling and work experience in a wage regression increasing over
time.
On the other hand, if the current employee commits to long-term employment and internal
promotion, then the employee has incentives of investment in the industry-specific and/or firm-
specific human capital,10 which might be less complementary to schooling, an opportunity of
investment in general human capital. If complementarity between schooling and industry-
and/or firm-specific skill is sufficiently weak to be dominated by the employer learning effect,
then the interaction term between schooling and tenure in the firm is expected to have non-
increasing coefficient over time.
While the employer learning model is entitled as a “public” learning model, its prediction
in fact seems to better fit with employer learning process within internal labor market of large
firms from the viewpoint of dynamics of workers’ investment in human capital, instead of the
competitive outside market.
However, it does not devalue the importance of testing employer learning. Informational
structure in the labor market varies over economies and human capital specificity does too.
Degree of asymmetry and relative efficacy of employer learning captures these two critical
dimensions of diversity in labor markets. Employer learning effect is an interesting focal
point of comparative analysis on diversified labor markets.
7Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010), pp. 10-36.
8Markey and Parks (1989), pp. 7-9. Parado, Caner and Wollf (2007), pp.445-447.
9Fallon and Layard (1975), p. 295. Goldin and Katz (1998), pp.710-723.
10Based on the NLSY, Parent (2000), pp. 308-320, shows that industry-specificity has larger impact on wages
than firm-specificity alone, which intuitively persuasive to us as a wage earner and seems to be applicable to
other economies than the US. In addition, Weinberg (2001), pp.236-247, verifies that industry specificity does
shield wages from exogenous shocks. Then, Poletaev and Robinson (2008), pp. 402-413, extracts impact of
skill-specificity on wages, embedded in industry-specificity. At the same time, Shaw and Lazer (2008), pp. 717-
720, extracts specific productivity gain of tenure at a specific firm, which implies the existence of firm-specific
human capital at least to some extent. Therefore, more correctly, we had better state that internal labor market of
a specific firm exists and it consists of industry-specificity and specific composition of skills. For simplicity, we
tentatively skip the logical step here.
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Succeeding close interest in the classical employer learning model, Galindo-Rueda (2003),
Scho¨nberg (2007), Pinkston (2009) are conscious of a possible asymmetry in employer learn-
ing and thus in particular effect of tenure in total experience, Bauer and Haisken-DeNew
(2001) deals with human capital investment complementary to schooling, and Baker, Gibbs
and Holmstrom (1994b) and Lluis (2005) inquire wage dynamics of internal labor markets.
Knitting up these three attractive strands, this research tries to distinguish learning effects in
wage growth in and out of internal labor market, using panel data of the Japanese steel industry
exactly at the time when it introduced internal labor market policy.
1.2 Technology, skill, and organization
Desirable structure of organization depends on prevalence of relevant information, and techno-
logical conditions shape informational structure. Technological changes affect organizational
structure in this way. It particularly holds for labor organization within a firm. Technological
changes affect type of necessary skill, and it could determine which player, either employees
or the firm, knows the skill better. If the firm knows better about necessary skill, then direct
control of labor organization could provide employees with better incentives. Given technol-
ogy, skill and information structure, a firm chooses a better organization to reduce loss from
asymmetric information. In other words, through the firm’s decision, combination of technol-
ogy, skill, and informational structure shapes labor organization. Internal labor market is a
candidate when a firm knows necessary skills well and the skills are complementary to each
other and/or firm-specific.11
Internal labor markets characterized by long-term employment and internal promotion are
widely seen for high-skilled workers of large companies in developed economies. Labor orga-
nizations of white-collar employees and high-class engineers are not uniquely determined by
technology and are often firm-specific, so internal labor markets are widely applied on white-
collar employees and engineers. It is also introduced for ordinary blue-collar employees of
manufacturing in some industries where systematic procedures are required as typically in
steel, petroleum refineries, paper mills, and so on.12 These industries, at the same time, are the
very ones which Goldin and Katz (1998) asserts have grown with technology-skill/education
complementarity since the early 20th century.13
Empirical and descriptive works on the issue in the last two decades have rejected the
traditional conjecture that, either in the US and in Japan, the internal labor market drives wage
dynamics irrelevantly to performance or merit. Rather, it is a evaluation device as a second
best approach to make wages sensitive to performance of employees and to give employees
incentives of investment in industry- and/or firm-specific human capital under asymmetric
information between employer and employee. Thus it is expected that wages do not depart
market from the market price equal to marginal productivity in the long term on average,
11Doeringer and Piore (1971), pp. 1-7. Williamson, Wachter and Harris (1975), pp. 269-277. Milgrom and
Roberts (1992), pp. 358-385.
12Doeringer and Piore (1971), pp. 6, 50-51, 58.
13Goldin and Katz (1998), pp. 707-716.
4
though they are not necessarily one-to-one equal in the short term.14
Japanese manufacturing, led by the steel industry as in the US, headed that way in the
1920s, and after the Second World War, developed even more internal-labor-market-oriented.
Then “life-time employment” came to be known as a feature of the Japanese manufacturing.
As the US firms of good performance have continuously managed long-term employment,15 it
is not a unique culture of Japanese firm, while it is true that post-war Japanese firms have more
steeply tilted to long-term employment and wage growth with tenure.16 The point is arguably
in that Japan experienced a faster and deeper transition of the same direction shared with other
developed economies.
1.3 Transformation in the steel industry
Different from typically 20th century industries like petroleum refineries, transition to the in-
ternal labor markets in major industries with longer tradition was accompanied by dissolution
of autonomous intermediary labor organization into well organized labor organization directly
and systematically planned by firms, as originally pointed out by the radical economists and
then redefined as transition to a more efficient second best organization by new institutional
economists.17 Such a transition would proceed with technological transformation that pro-
vides firms with informational advantages in acquisition of relevant human capital, which
makes direct control by the firm relatively efficient.
As to the Japanese steel industry, big two phases of technological transition were seen
in the 1920s and in the 1950s as larger open-hearth furnaces were introduced, and in the
1960s when converter furnaces were introduced under the American influence. Along with
the technological transition, traditional skill ascriptive to individual senior employees was
transformed to the skill manualized and known to the management.18 As with in the American
steel industry,19 it was the core in the transition to frame a work organization with systematic
wage and promotion scheme.
This research deals with wage growth of blue-collar employees from 1929 to 1969 of
the Kamaishi Iron Works,20 a leading iron works then in Japan, and approaches to employer
learning and human capital specificity in wage dynamics during formation of internal labor
14Alexander (1974), pp. 74-83, Aoki (1988), pp. 54-60. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a), pp. 881-884.
Baker and Holmstrom (1995), pp. 256-257.
15Hall (1980), pp. 97-107. Hall (1982), pp. 719-720. A measure of the importance of long-term employment
in human capital investment is relative impact of tenure at a firm and total work experience on wages. Abe (2000)
shows based on the data of the 1980s that tenure alone had considerable impact on wages in the US while relative
importance of tenure over experience is indeed larger in Japan than in the US (Abe (2000), pp. 261-264.).
16Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), pp. 721-732. Aoki (1988), pp. 59-69. Mincer and Higuchi (1988), pp. 112-
115. Moriguchi (2003), pp. 640-652. While mobility of younger generations have increased since the 1990s,
long-term employment is still prevailed practice among large Japanese firms. Ono (2010), pp. 13-22.
17Marglin (1974), pp. 60-81. Stone (1974), pp. 128-147. Williamson (1985), pp. 206-239.
18In the case of department of maintenance, the Kamaishi Iron Works, intangible knowledge that had bee
inherited from senior workers to younger workers was made standardized, written as a rich manual and controlled
by the firm in the early 1970s. Nakamura (2010), pp. 24-25.
19Novack and Perlman (1962), pp. 339-347. Stone (1974), pp. 128-136. Williamson (1985), pp. 234-236.
20belonged to Fuji Iron and Steel Corporation then, now belongs to Nippon Steel Corporation.
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market. To be analyzed is micro data of 1490 employees of the Kamaishi Iron Works.
The section 2 presents the estimation model. The section 3 describes the data and then
verifies existence of internal labor market at the case firm. The section 4 gives empirical
results.
2 Estimation model under internal labor market effect
2.1 Employer learning
Here we briefly review the classical employer learning model to make that fit to random ef-
fect estimation. Consider a random effect model of panel least square regression of the ith
employee’s wage (w) at time t (i=1, . . . , n),
(1) wi;t = 0 + 1yosi + 2yosi  t+ 3t+ i + i;t;
where yosi stands for years of schooling that is observable to employer and stochastic i cap-
tures time-invariant characteristics unobserved by the employer.
And put
(2) twi;t = 2yosi + 3 +tE(i j yosi; t  1) +ti;t  2yosi + 3 + 'i;t;
where ti;t is serially independent innovation and 'i;t is aggregate shock in the tth year.
Then inference based on the “public” employer learning model by Farber and Gibbons
(1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) brings a straightforward prediction as a benchmark.21
Linear projection of wi;t gives
E(wi;t j yosi) =^0 + ^1yosi + ^2yosi  t+ ^3t
=^0 + ^1yosi +
Cov(wi;t; yosi  t)
V (yosi  t)
yosi  t+ ^3t
=^0 + ^1yosi +
Pt
=2Cov('i; ; yosi  )
V (yosi  t)
yosi  t+ ^3t:
(3)
Cov(wi;t; yosi;t) contains two-dimensional effect of cross-sectional one over workers i =
1; : : : ; n and longitudinal over period t.
First, if schooling and experience are complements (@2y=(@yos@) > 0), then
Covi(' ; yos ) > 0;
and otherwise
Covi(' ; yos )  0;
for each  ( = 2; : : : ; t). It says that covariance between ' and yos  t should be positive
in the cross-sectional dimension of workers i = 1; : : : ; n if schooling and experience are
complements and non-positive otherwise for each period t.
21Farber and Gibbons (1996), pp. 1010-1018. Altonji and Pierret (2001), pp. 316-323.
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Second, if employers have learned employees’ characteristics hidden when recruiting,
which is captured by i, then there exists some t such that tE(i j yosi; t   1) is decreasing
in t  t and tE(i j yosi; t   1) = 0 for t > t. Then Covt('i; yosi  t) is decreasing in
t  t and Covt('i; yosi  t) = 0 for t > t for each i. It states that covariance between 'i and
yosi  t is decreasing for t = t and 0 for t > t in the longitudinal dimension over t for each
individual worker i.
Suppose that wages, with marginal productivity, increase over experience and standardize
variables by taking logarithmic specification.22 Then, predicted are,
(a) If the employer learns employees’ hidden characteristics over time, and if schooling and
experience are not complements or the effect of their complementarity is dominated by
that of employer learning, then ^2 is expected to be negative.23
(b) If schooling and experience are complements and the the effect of complementarity
dominates that of employer learning, then ^2 is expected to be positive.
Based on the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of the US, empirical evidences to
support (a) have been presented.24 It is also doomed that employer learning progresses fast
especially in the first few years.25
2.2 Asymmetric learning, employees’ incentives, and diversified labor
markets
An interesting issue to improve learning model is the extent of asymmetry in employer learn-
ing. About the US labor market, Pinkston (2009) finds that informational structure in employer
learning is asymmetrically favorable to incumbent employers and thus tenure has impact on
learning additional to total experience,26 while Scho¨nberg (2007) evaluates that the asymme-
try is not so large as it affects the speed of employer learning.27 About the UK, on the other
hand, as Galindo-Rueda (2003) recognizes strong evidence of employer learning, it also finds
22While the standard wage estimation of Mincer style regresses logarithmic term of wage on raw level num-
bers, here in this research regressors are also transformed to logarithmic terms because estimation of the equation
(4) with controlling all of cohort effects requires already many independent variables. The standard estimation
model needs to contain squared terms of experience and tenure to allow their effects to be marginally decreasing,
but adding squared terms here makes estimation results less readable. To allow experience and tenure effects
to be marginally decreasing, here their logarithmic terms are used as regressors instead of squared terms of raw
level.
23In the raw level term, non complementarity implies significantly zero of ^2. Under logarithmic specifica-
tion, with increase of relative impact of time variant factors such as tenure, relative impact of interaction between
schooling and tenure decreases over time if they are not complementary, which implies a negative sign.
24Farber and Gibbons (1996), pp. 1023-1029. Altonji and Pierret (2001), pp.329-342. Lange (2007), pp. 4-7.
25Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent (2005), pp. 698-714. Lange (2007), pp. 9-19. A similar case in
Germany is presented by Lluis (2005), pp. 745-755.
26Pinkston (2009), pp. 381-389.
27Scho¨nberg (2007), pp. 672-678.
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stronger learning effect of tenure, instead of total experience of workers, and asserts that in-
cumbent employers have informational advantage in learning over entrant employers.28 As
later shown on Table 4, the same effect is clearly observed in the Japanese labor market.
Another point to be considered is specificity of human capital. The prediction of employer
learning does not explicitly consider workers’ dynamic decision making in human capital
ivestment. Workers are reasonably expected to choose workplaces to maximize lifetime in-
come, given their educational background. While both of the schooling market and the labor
market have frictions, friction with choice of schools seems to be much larger.29 It was the case
especially prewar Japan where public elementary and secondary schools were dominant, and
districts of elementary schools were determined by the government as they are now. Children
typically enrolled in assigned schools, graduated them, and finally made their own conscious
decision when they chose workplaces.
Without particular constraints or distortions, people in the competitive open market, es-
pecially under employment contracts of short-term basis, are naturally to choose work ex-
periences such that schooling and work experiences are complements if other conditions are
the same. This direction of human capital investment has become even more desirable since
the early 20th century, as technology-skill/education complementarity has become augmented
with transition of production process from artisanal shops to factory system, continuous pro-
duction system, and “computerized” production line30.
On the other hand, if the current employer commits to operating internal labor market
policy consisting of long-term employment and internal promotion, then the employees could
have incentives to invest in industry- and/or firm-specific human capital that might be less
complementary to general skills that have been taught at schools. Indeed, in the case of the
US, industry-specificity of human capital obviously decrease mobility of workers, and induce
firms to protect wages and employment of experienced workers against exogenous shocks
more than they do for young workers. That kind of commitment is necessary to entice workers
invest in industry- and/or firm-specific human capital.31
The intensity of technology-skill/educatoin complementarity and employers’ adjustment
to it could affect institutional arrangement in the labor market and accordingly employer learn-
ing process. In the German case, after Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001) found the dominant
effect of complementarity between schooling and work experience and did not recognize the
employer learning effect,32 Lluis (2005) succeeded in carefully mining some evidence of em-
ployer learning by controlling job-rank effects.33 The German labor market appears to be
modeled as friendly to investment in general human capital, compared with those in the US,
the UK,34 and Japan inquired by this research.
Diversity of labor markets consists of institutional framework that encourages human cap-
28Galindo-Rueda (2003), pp. 13-15.
29In addition, kids themselves tend to be ignorant about return of schooling as reported by Jensen (2010).
30Goldin and Katz (1996), pp. 253-256. Goldin and Katz (1998), pp. 698-719. Autor, Katz and Kearney
(2006), pp. 190-191.
31Weinberg (2001), pp. 236-251.
32Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001), pp. 163-177.
33Lluis (2005), pp. 749-755.
34Galindo-Rueda (2003), pp. 8-17,
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ital investment and informational structure that enables employers to learn workers’ types.
The coefficient of interaction term between schooling and experience is a tractable measure
of employer learning. At the same time, the mesure also captures diversity of labor markets,
which varies with institutions of human capital investment and informational structure about
workers’ types.
2.3 Identification of the internal labor market effect in the wage growth
With concerns about investment in human capital, workers are expected to invest in general
human capital both at schools and workplaces if their employers do not commit to internal
labor market policy. On the other hand, employers generally do not have incentives to invest
in general human capital of employees. If any, employers willingly invest in environments
favorable to accumulation of firm-specific human capital. On the other hand, employees could
have incentives of investment in firm-specific human capital if their employers do commit to
internal labor market policy.
To capture this effect of internal labor market that potentially slips into strings of wage
determination, empirical exercise later separates ith employee’s experiences before and after
he joined the firm that commits to internal labor market policy such as t = epr = pvr + ten,
where pvr is experience before he joined the case firm, ten is tenure at the firm, and epr is
total experience. Then the wage regression equation (3) is reformulated as
wi;t = 0 + 1yosi
+ 2yosi  pvr + 3yosi  ten
+ 4epr + 5ten + 
Txi + 
Txi  ten + i + i;t;
(4)
where xi stands for time-invariant characteristics vector other than educational background.35
Taking logarithmic specification, predictions from employer learning combined with work-
ers’ concerns about investment in human capital are,
Prediction 1. the interaction term between years of schooling and previous experience before
employed by the firm (yos  pvr) is expected to have positive coefficient (^2 > 0), which
indicates that complementarity between schooling and work experiences is strong enough to
dominate the employer learning effect,
and,
Prediction 2. the interaction term between years of schooling and tenure after employed by
the firm (yos ten) is expected to have negative coefficient (^3 < 0), which indicates that the
35Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001), pp. 163-170, applies this formulation of regression on the German data
to inquire whether employer learning goes “publicly” in the labor market (through workers’ total experience)
or “privately” (thorough tenure at specific firms), and denies any employer learning effect, which is strikingly
different result from the US and Japan cases. We will be back to this point in the section 5.1. Also, Scho¨nberg
(2007), pp. 664-666, and Pinkston (2009), pp. 384-389, add tenure as regressors in the wage regression, to
inquire possible difference in learning processes of incumbent and outside employers, and the latter emphasizes
asymmetry between incumbent and entrant employers.
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firm learns employees’ hidden characteristics over tenure, and that schooling and tenure are
not complements, or the learning effect dominates their complementarity effect if any.
It is examined in the section 4.3 whether this prediction is supported or not.
3 The case firm and the data
3.1 Kamaishi Iron Works on its historical context
Kamaishi IronWorks is the oldest iron works in Japan, opened by the Nambu Domain in 1857.
After nationalized in 1873 and privatized again in 1884, new blast furnaces were built and
began integrated production of pig iron and steel in 1903. After owned by the Mitsui holdings,
the largest conglomerate, in 1924, it was merged with other major iron works into Nippon
Iron and Steel in 1933. The merge was coordinated by the government for technological
improvement.
Then, Japan entered the war against the US, and during the wartime isolation, Japanese
steel industry turned out to be even more backward. After the Second World War, steel com-
panies as well as other important manufacturing companies were induced to invest in new
technology with long-term financing coordinated by the government. For the iron and steal in-
dustry, three coordinated modernization investments were planned. The “1st plan” was 1951-
1954, the “2nd plan” was 1956-1960, and the “3rd plan” was 1961-1964. Through the plan,
for the Kamaishi Iron Works, then an iron works of Fuji Iron and Steel, and now of Nip-
pon Steel, improvement of efficiency in iron and steel production and expansion of fine steel
production were emphasized, but replacement of old blast furnaces was not planned.
A big change during the modernization since the 1950s at production lines was standard-
ization, or “manualization,” of production procedures. Before the Second World War, in the
iron and steal industry, sophisticated procedures of production were developed by employees
and taught to younger employees by the elder. Since the 1950s, however, procedures of pro-
ductions lines became manualized by better educated engineers, and the best practices at the
shop floor came to be known to the firm.36
As a part of company wide investment plan, Fuji Iron and Steel decided to build a new
state-of-the-art plant then named Tokai in Nagoya, now Nagoya Iron Works of Nippon Steel.
Because it was a new plant, skilled workers were not there. About iron production capacity,
the firm decided to decrease Kamaishi’s and to increase other new plants such as Tokai, and
to relocate skilled workers of Kamaishi and other old iron works to Tokai. Then 1,678 skilled
workers moved from Kamaishi to Tokai in 1964, 1967, 1968, and 1969.37
36Nakamura (2010), pp. 8-21.
37With 1,678 from Kamaishi, 908 from Muroran, 972 from Hirohata, and 127 from Kawasaki were relocated.
Umezaki (2010), pp. 33-38.
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3.2 The data
This research uses preserved 1,490 relocated Kamaishi employees’ panel data of wages, track-
ing from the late 1920s or later, depending on employee, to the 1960s, when they left Ka-
maishi. This data set has both considerable disadvantage and advantage.
The disadvantage is in selection and survival biases. Selection for relocation was handled
under close dialogues and coordination between the firm and the union, and, in principle,
anyone who was willing to move were allowed to be relocated. Thus, there was not a clear
and intended measure to select employees for relocation.38 However, it is not followed that this
is an unbiased sample set. First, employees who willingly moved to Nagoya were those who
believed that they would get successfully used to the most advanced plant. They were more
ambitious and/or self-confident employees than average. Second, all of the sample employees
were those who had worked until they moved to Nagoya in the 1960s. The “losers” in the
internal competition at Kamaishi who dropped are not included. Selected employees were
likely to be the employees trained to get used to new technology, and well built-in internal
labor market that was formed during the technological transition.
At the same time, the data set also has advantages respectable especially for this research.
Intrinsically to original personnel documents, the documents contain all important information
on employees’ CV when they were employed. It enables us to recover their whole life from
the time when they were born to the late 1960s when they were relocated. The information
includes records of previous working experiences not only educational record, and physical
features such as height, weight, and lung capacity, which were thought to be important for
blue-collar workers.
Each individual wage record includes:
1. Educational background (yos).
2. Physical characteristics when employed: height (hgt), weight and lung capacity.
3. Panel data of
(1) record of in-house training if the employee completed one:
 Systematic programs for those selected from newly employed employees:
1927-1935: “Youth Development Center (Seinen Kunrenjo)” (ydc). Three
days a week, 4 years, 300 hours as total.
1935-1948: “School for Youth (Seinen Gakko)” (sy). Halftime, three days a
week.
1939-1946: “Development Center for Technicians (Ginosha Yoseijo)” (dct).
Fulltime, 3 years, 6,453 hours as total.
1946-1973: “Development Center (Kyoshujo)” (dc). Three days a week, 2
years (by 1950), 6 days a week (from 1950). From 1953, only
high school graduates were admitted.
38Umezaki (2010), pp.47-49.
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 Short term programs (ex. elementary calculus).
(2) licenses the employee held.
(3) family composition.
(4) clinical history.
(5) basic wages.
(6) promotion and deployment: classes, division and department assignment, and job
assignment. The 49 divisions, 174 departments and 110 jobs have been recorded
in the total.
The panel data of the basic wage starts when the employee joined the firm, and ends at the
time when he moved to the Tokai Iron Works, varying from 1964 to 1969.
Composition of cohorts is shown on Table 1. The first and small peak of hiring is across
from 1938 to 1942, when the wartime effort hit the peak with invasion to China in earnest from
1937 and the attack to the Pearl Harbor in 1941, followed by the American backfire including
carpet bombing on the city of Kamaishi, and the second and highest peak is across from 1948
to 1951, when the Japanese economy began to recover from the wartime destruction. Then the
last and small peak is around the late 1950s, when Japan began is rapid growth and the firm
had not built new state-of-the-art iron works.
An especially important feature of the data set is in that those who were employed im-
mediately after graduation are not dominant, which might not look a typically Japanese firm.
The recruitment practice to employ new graduates was being prevailed for blue-collar work-
ers since the mid 1960s, and not typical at all before that time. Indeed, the mean of previous
experience (years after graduating school and before being employed by the firm, pvr) is even
not monotonically decreasing.
Since the late 19th century, when the heavy manufacturing was introduced from the West-
ern world, career path of experiencing several workplaces to acquire skill and then being
employed by a large firm in the long-term basis, or starting own workshop became a typical
one among skilled workers. This tradition is not only well exploited by this research strategy
on the equation (4). So-called “port of entry” practice of typically “Japanese firm,” under
which employees are recruited immediately after they graduate schools without experience at
any other workplace was not prevailed for blue-collar workers even at the leading firm of the
steel industry, the core industry then, in the covered period. It could allow empirical results of
this research to be comparable to other industrial economies.
Compulsory education was extended from 6 years to 9 years in 1947, as shown in the min-
imum years of schooling on Table 1. Difference of educational background across employees
who graduated before 1947 is distributed mainly between 6 years of completing mandatory
elementary school and 8 years composed of mandatory 6 years and 2 years of completing high
elementary school. Table 1 shows graduates of high elementary school were majority before
1947.39 Difference of employees who graduated after 1947 is distributed mainly between the
mandatory 9 yeas of elementary school (6 years) and junior high school (3 years) and the 12
39Already in the 1920s, major factories of heavy industry had preference of graduates of high elementary
schools to those of elementary schools, especially for candidates of foremen. Sugayama (2011), p. 37.
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years of mandatory 9 years plus additional 3 years of high school. High school graduates were
minority still in the 1960s.
3.3 Verifying existence of internal labor market
Before estimating the equation (4), the existence of internal labor market policy, which some-
how “shields” wage determination from the outside market, itself to be empirically estab-
lished. We basically follow the strategy presented by Baker et al. (1994b).
If a firm offers competitive wages to revealed characteristics such as educational back-
ground of prospective employees in the market when the firm recruits workers, and if the firm
adopts internal labor market policy under which wages are determined based on internal rules
or evaluation that more or less “shields” internal wage dynamics from the market price, then
wage growth of each cohort could share common trend “shielded” from the market price. Thus
survival of cohort effect is a useful indicator of existence of internal labor market that some-
how “shields” wage determination from the outside price mechanism at each point,40 though
it does not imply that the wage dynamics deviates from the market price in the long term.
Table 2 contains regression of real daily wages (rw) on experience in the labor market
(epr), tenure (ten), 2-year joined dummy such as yj1928 1929, yj1930 1931, yj1932 1933,
..., and interaction between 2-year joined dummy and tenure such as (yj1928   1929)  ten,
(yj1930  1931) ten, (yj1932  1933) ten... To control composition effect of educational
background varying over cohorts, years of schooling (yos) is also inserted as a regressor. The
period saw a rapid growth of average productivity, which is controlled by year dummies. On
the model 1-2, to allow cohort effect be decreasing in tenure, interaction term of 2-year joined
dummy and tenure (yj ten) is inserted as a regressor instead of tenure (ten).41
Cohort effects generally survive among employees of all cohorts. The internal labor market
at the Kamaishi Iron Works seems to have been formed in the 1930s. This statistical inference
is consistent with descriptive picture based on documents and hearings.42
Thus the basic wage at the first year shows the open market price of his labor, and the
growth of the basic wage in the following year shows the firm’s evaluation of his labor based
on some internal measures.
As Baker et al. (1994b) describes, serial correlation of wage growth is another useful
marker of internal labor market.43 In the competitive market where wage increments are se-
rially independent, coefficient of the first-lagged should be 1 in auto-regression of wage. If
the firm “shields” wage determination from the market by some wage policy, the result would
40Baker et al. (1994b), pp. 923, 933-940. Baker and Holmstrom (1995), pp. 258-259.
41Our approach differs from Baker et al. (1994b) in some important points. In order to avoid identification
difficulty and still to extract cohort effect, Baker et al. (1994b) assumes that tenure effect on wage growth is
linear, estimates the coefficient of linear regression of wages on tenure, deducts the estimated tenure effect from
cohort average wage, and regress this adjusted cohort average wage on cohort dummies. However, in this data
set, as decreasing impact of past wage in the equation (6) below shows, tenure effect is not linear. Also, two-
staged estimation seems to have cohort effect appear larger than real. Hence, to deal with identification problem,
we simply bind adjacent two cohorts together into one group, and then regress wages on two-cohort groups.
42Umezaki (2010), pp. 42-51.
43Baker et al. (1994b), pp. 943-953.
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different.
Auto regression with random effects of real wage (rwten), with years of education (yosi)
and year dummies inserted, gives,44
(5) log rwten = 0:3424
21:6217
  0:0080
16:1141
yos + 0:8426
354:7567
log rwten 1;
where absolute value of the coefficient of lagged term (rwten 1) is smaller than 1, which
means each history of wage is a contraction mapping.45 If the shock of each year is serially
independent innovation as the pure learning model of Farber and Gibbons (1996) assumes, the
coefficient of lagged term should be 1, which is rejected by the equation (5). At the same time,
the coefficient smaller than 1 of the equation (5) mentions that each wage history is heading
for somewhere stationary, in a sense consistent of employer learning story over tenure.
Furthermore, a regression of real wage on more lagged terms gives with random effects
and year dummies gives,46
log rwten = 0:3338
(21:2829)
  0:0004
0:7289
yos
+ 0:4450
(52:8953)
log rwten 1 + 0:1485
(17:6055)
log rwten 2
+ 0:0765
(9:0439)
log rwten 3 + 0:0592
(7:4901)
log rwten 4
+ 0:0640
(8:4776)
log rwten 5 + 0:0394
(5:5702)
log rwten 6
+ 0:0332
(5:1365)
log rwten 7 + 0:0226
(4:8108)
log rwten 8:
(6)
While the past has significant impact on the current wage growth, the impact is monotonically
decreasing, with each wage history going to some stable phase.47
Periods in concern saw rapid growth of labor productivity in the industry, hence average
wage accordingly rapidly grew on average. On the equations (5) and (6), however, the effect
is controlled by the year dummies inserted.
Following serial correlations seen on the equations (5) and (6), first, the sample employees
are heterogeneous and there were “systematic winners and losers”48 probably due to different
ability of human capital accumulation,49 and second, wage dynamics is on trajectory to some
44Estimation: Panel estimated generalized least squares with cross-section random effects. Year dummies:
Yes. Sample periods: 40 (1930-1969). Cross-sections included: 1,482. Total panel observations: 20,511. The t
statistics are within parentheses, where  stands for significance smaller than 1 percent. Adjusted R2: 0:9691.
F -statistic: 15; 706:8328.
45It implies that extended growth curve of wage has unique fixed point.
46Estimation: Panel estimated generalized least squares with cross-section random effects. Year dummies:
Yes. Sample periods: 33 (1937-1969). Cross-section included: 1,093. Total panel observations 11,393. Adjusted
R2: 0:9623. F statistic: 7099:4704.
47Absolute values of all real roots of 1 0:4450z 0:1485z2 0:0765:z3 0:0592z4 0:0640z5 0:0394z6 
0:0332z7   0:0226z8 = 0, z =  1:8900; 1:0476, are greater than 1, which implies the auto-regression equation
(6) is stationary as the equation (5) is.
48Baker and Holmstrom (1995), p. 257. The result is theoretically predicted by symmetric learning of the
employer and the employee (Gibbons and Waldman (1999), pp. 1333-1341.).
49Baker et al. (1994b), p. 947.
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steady state, which is supposed to be true value of the employee’s “latent” ability, as pictured
by descriptive formulation of Baker et al. (1994b). Though this process with serial correlation
is not directly drawn from the “pure” employer learning model, it is consistent with secondary
story derived from the employer learning model. If the employer, for instance, uses accumu-
lated information for assignment of employees, then such a regularly serial correlation could
be observed 50
Thus the monotonic shape of trajectory is at least partly due to the employer learning
process.
However, this roughly monotonic trajectory is not necessarily the same over cohorts. Ta-
ble 3 regresses real wage rwten on interaction terms of 2-year joined dummy and the 1st
and 2nd lagged term such as (yj1928  1929) log rwten 1, (yj1930  1931) log rwten 1,
(yj1932 1933)log rwten 1, ..., (yj1928 1929)log rwten 2, (yj1930 1931)log rwten 2,
(yj1932   1933)  log rwten 2, . Then the results obviously shows similar, but considerably
and significantly different wage curves even between adjacent cohorts. This is exactly the
feature of wage curves in a internal labor market Baker et al. (1994b) depicts profiles of mean
wage over different cohorts.51 It implies that we need to carefully control cohort effects to
inquire Prediction 1 and Prediction 2 in the section 2.3 by estimating equation (4).
4 Empirical results
4.1 Overview: Tenure, employer learning, and in-house training
Before directly going to estimation of the equation (4), let us give an overview based on the
ordinary regression equation (3) as a benchmark, to make it easier to compare this research
with previous ones. Table 4 gives results of random effect estimation regressing real wage
(rw) on height when employed by the firm (hgt), years of schooling the employee had com-
pleted (yos), total experience in the labor market (epr), tenure at the firm (ten), interaction
of height and experience (hgt  epr), interaction of height and tenure (hgt  ten), interac-
tion of years of schooling and experience (yos  epr), interaction of years of schooling and
tenure (yos ten), dummy variables of completing in-house training programs, Development
Center for Youth (dcy, operated in 1927-1935), School of Youth (sy, operated in 1935-1948),
Development Center for Technicians (dct, operated in 1939-1946), Development Center (dc,
operated in 1946-1973), interaction of them and tenure (dcy  ten, sy  ten, dct  ten,
dc ten).52 The compulsory schooling was extended from 6 years of elementary school to 9
years of 6-year elementary school and 3-year junior high school in 1947. Since extension of
compulsory schooling could have big impact on productivity and wages,53 the postwar educa-
tion generation dummy (psw) is inserted.
Tenure is robustly significant in all regressions. Experience within the firm strongly con-
tributed to wage growth. At the same time, the employer learning hypothesis strongly holds
50Baker et al. (1994b), pp. 924, 926-927, 952-954.
51Baker et al. (1994b), pp. 933-935.
52Some samples lack the information of height, weight, and lung capacity.
53Oleopoulos (2005), pp. 158-170.
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without controlling cohort effect. On Table 4, interaction terms of years of schooling both
with experience after graduation (yos  epr) and tenure (yos  ten) have significantly nega-
tive coefficients in the models of 4-2 and 4-4. Negatively significant coefficient of yos  ten
indicates that the current employer learned better than previous employers, as the American
and the British cases.54
As well as years of schooling, a proxy of ability observable to the employer when recruited
is physical characteristics such as height. Height is thought to sometime affect wages,55 while
the channel is still ambiguous especially for white-collar workers.56 In the case of blue-collar
workers in the steel industry, the industry of masculine then, however, the physical strength
was definitely critical especially in the department of pig iron production where workers were
required to be tough against extremely high-temperature and to still make difficult decision
about how to manage blast-furnace that determined the quality of pig iron, the raw material of
high-value-added of fine steel. Height is a good proxy of such physical strength. Again, also
about height, the employer learning hypothesis holds. Interaction terms of height with tenure
(hgt ten) has significantly negative coefficient in the models 4-3 and 4-4.
4.2 Schooling and in-house training programs
Table 4 also shows that role of training programs changed over the period. The interaction of
postwar program with tenure (dc ten) has significantly negative coefficient while the inter-
action terms of prewar programs with tenure (dcyten; syten; dctten) have significantly
positive ones in the models 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4.
All of Development Center for Youth, School of Youth, Development Center for Techni-
cians, and Development Center were operated exclusively for newly employed employees at
entry-level. As some of entry-level employees were chosen, the employer had not yet learned
hidden types of employees and the firm likely used some proxy to choose trainees from newly
employed employees. In particular, the change in sign of interaction terms with tenure from
the prewar programs (dcy  ten, sy  ten, dct ten) to the postwar program (dc ten) can
be attributed to selection policy of Development Center (dc), which admitted only high school
graduates since 1953. Closely linked to educational back ground, the effect of in-house train-
ing program also came to decrease over tenure as the employer learned types of employees
hidden when recruited.
4.3 Internal labor market effect
The empirical overview so far has established that employer learning hypothesis saliently
holds particularly after employed as interactions of years of schooling and height with tenure
(yos ten, hgt ten) have significantly negative coefficients. Next we proceed to extraction
of some information about interaction between employees’ history before employed by the
firm and wages.
54Pinkston (2009), pp. 384-387. Galindo-Rueda (2003), pp. 13-15.
55Hersch (2008), pp. 369-375.
56Kuhn and Weinberger (2005), pp. 418-420.
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Now examine the equation (4) and the Prediction 1 and Prediction 2 in the section 2.3.
The first approach of a straightforward specification without control of cohort effect is pre-
sented on Table 5. With changes of return on schooling controlled by inserting interaction
between year dummy and schooling (dy  yos), interaction term between years of schooling
and previous experience (yos pvr) has significantly positive coefficient, which violates em-
ployer learning hypothesis and supports Prediction 1, while interaction term between years
of schooling and tenure (yos ten) has significantly negative coefficient that supports asym-
metric learning hypothesis and Prediction 2.
Similar but different wage curves on (Table 3) urges us to control of cohort effects for
robustness check of the results on Table 5. Therefore, Table 6 presents a regression of real
wage (rw) with random effects on years of schooling (yos), experience after graduation and
before employed by the firm (pvr), tenure after employed by the firm (ten), and, inspired
by the Table 3, interaction term of 2-year joined dummy, years of schooling and previous
experience before employed by the firm ((yj1928   1929)  yos  pvr, ...), interaction term
of cohort dummy, years of schooling and tenure ((yj1928  1929) yos ten, ...) to control
cohort effects on interaction between schooling and work experience. Table 6 also controls
training programs (dcy, sy, dct, dc), interaction terms between training programs and tenure
(dcy  ten, sy  ten, dct  ten, dc  ten), and interactions between year dummy and years
of schooling (dy  yos) to capture changes in return of schooling over the period.
Then, again, except for early cohorts up to the mid 1930s, interaction term between years
of schooling and previous experience (yos pvr) has significantly positive coefficient, which
violates the employer learning hypothesis and supports the Prediction 1, while interaction
term between years of schooling and tenure (yos ten) has significantly negative coefficients
also here, which supports asymmetric employer learning hypothesis as well as the Prediction
2 in the section 2.3. The feature showed on Table 5 was widely shared among most cohorts
except for the early cohorts and its results are robust
An immediate interpretation of the results on Table 5 and Table 6, considering average
years of previous experience on Table 1, is that workers had chosen workplace experiences
given their educational background such that they were in fact complementary to schooling
before employed by the firm in the first several years in their job career, and, after employed by
the firm, invested in firm-specific human capital not necessarily complementary to schooling,
as the firm also learned employees’ ability that was not informed by educational background.
Workers invested in general human capital at schools and workplaces before they joined the
internal labor market, and turned to investment in human capital less complementary to school-
ing after they joined the firm. This is a story consistent with the result.
While regression of wages on the interaction term between years of schooling and expe-
rience (yos  epr) on Table 4 suggests that employer learning holds, the results on Table 5
and Table 6 indicates that coefficient of the interaction term between years of schooling and
experience (yos  epr) could be divided into two effects of before and after employed by the
firm (yos pvr, yos ten), whose coefficients’ signs are opposite.
The classical employer learning hypothesis assumed small significance of complementar-
ity between schooling and work experience in workers’ young days, and “public” learning
in the competitive labor market and (Farber and Gibbons (1996)). However, the result here
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shows first that learning effect does not dominate complementary effect of schooling and ex-
perience as workers invested in general capital in their early stages of career, which is the phe-
nomenon observed even longer in the German case as clarified by Bauer and Haisken-DeNew
(2001), and second that employer learning is asymmetric that goes much more effective, as
the American and the British cases presented by Pinkston (2009) and Galindo-Rueda (2003),
after workers join long-term employment instead of “publicly” going through in the competi-
tive market. Interaction term between years of schooling and experience (yos epr) on Table
4 appears to support employer learning, but it is not because the workers’ ability came to be
“publicly” learned in the market over total experience, but because the long-term employer
learned much better after employees were incorporated to the internal labor market.
Indeed, coefficient of the interaction term between years of schooling and previous expe-
rience (yos pvr) is significantly positive, as that between years of schooling and experience
after employed by the firm (yos  ten) is significantly negative on Table 5 and Table 6.
Because the latter effect is large enough, it appears, coefficient of interaction between years
of schooling and experience (yos  epr) on Table 4 is negative. In this sense, significantly
negative coefficient of the interaction term between years of schooling and and experience
(yos epr) seems to capture an effect of the internal labor market.
5 Discussion: implication of the empirical result
5.1 Identification of internal labor market effect and comparative anal-
ysis of labor markets
As the classical employer learning hypothesis assumes learning is “publicly” going in the
labor market, the corresponding empirical studies such as those based on the NLSY have
not differentiated employer learning outside and within the firm (Farber and Gibbons (1996),
Altonji and Pierret (2001)). However, recent results for the American and the British cases
have suggested more inquiry focusing on current employers in learning (Pinkston (2009),
Galindo-Rueda (2003)).
While the representative works of modern approach to the internal labor market does not
provide clear answer to the mixed picture, which partly supports employer learning, on-the-
job training, or comparative advantage hypotheses (Baker et al. (1994b), Gibbons et al. (2005),
Lluis (2005)), this Japanese case seems to support the hypothesis of effective employer learn-
ing within internal labor markets suggested by Baker et al. (1994b).57
Generalization of the Japanese experience too much might not sound plausible. Some em-
pirical evidences, however, indicate that long-term employment is seen and does have positive
impact wages and job protection in the American workplaces, to encourage industry-, firm-,
and/or skill-specific human capital.58 In addition, since the 1930s, basic wages of American
workers in fact have been even more shielded to exogenous demand shocks than Japanese
57Baker et al. (1994b), pp. 952-954.
58Hall (1980, 1982). Abe (2000), pp. 258-263. Weinberg (2001), pp. 236-251. Poletaev and Robinson
(2008), pp. 400-413.
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and British counterparts due to institutional settings of the labor market,59 and some empirical
results support the existence of implicit contract to shield wages from macroeconomic shocks
in the US.60
Furthermore, exactly based on the NLSY, Parent (1999) shows, first, current employers
reward on-the-job training completed with themselves, second, current employers also reward
on-the-job training their employees completed with previous employers, and third, employees
who have completed on-the-job training with current employers have lower separation rate, as
is expected in Japan.61 The result mentions that young American workers join long-term basis
employment after they accumulate experiences to be appreciated by the last employer.
Moreover, conjecture of faster employer learning in early stages has succeeded in provi-
sion of concrete empirical studies in an intra-firm data set,62 while a study based on the NLSY,
which include mixed ingredients of employees who are already incorporated into long-term
employment and yet to be, provides less clear result.63 Also here in the intra-firm data set of
Japanese steel industry, the faster employer learning the earlier stage principle is presented
very clearly on Table 6, as later cohorts, which capture employer learning effects on early
stages, show larger absolute value of negative coefficients of interaction term between years
of schooling and tenure (yos ten).
Along with the evidences, this case study suggests probability that existent empirical re-
sults to support the employer learning has been affected either by the effect of incumbent em-
ployers’ asymmetric learning or by investment in industry- and/or firm-specific human capital,
instead of symmetric learning in the competitive labor market.
Obviously, the extent of asymmetry of employer learning and the extent of complementar-
ity between schooling and experience could vary over economies. As Galindo-Rueda (2003),
Scho¨nberg (2007) and Pinkston (2009) together mention that employer learning goes a little
more symmetrically in the US than in the UK.64 Also, investment in human capital in Germany
inquired by Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001) seems to concentrate in industry-specificity in-
stead of firm-specificity even more than in the US labor market studied by Weinberg (2001).65
If skill is perfectly standardized within each industry, and if secondary schooling emphasizes
vocational education for specific industries more, instead of liberal arts, then skill is almost
always general to the most workers who do not change industry in their life courses and
schooling and work experience should be intrinsically complements.
Again, employer learning effect is a focal point of informational structure in the market
and degree of human capital specificity. Compared with the previous evidences for the US,
59American firms seem to adjust workdays instead of basic wages to demand shocks. Gordon (1982), pp.
18-42.
60Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), pp. 675-685. Similar results for Canada are presented by McDonald and
Worswick (1999), pp. 886-888. The same institutional setting of “shielding” could make wages sensitive to
the employer’s prosperity instead of the market and thus serial correlational, as shown by Dohmen (2004), pp.
746-752.
61Parent (1999), pp. 305-315.
62Lluis (2005), pp. 745-755.
63Gibbons et al. (2005), pp. 698-714.
64Galindo-Rueda (2003), pp. 13-15. Scho¨nberg (2007), pp. 672-675, Pinkston (2009), pp. 381-389.
65Weinberg (2001), pp.236-247. Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001), pp.l66-177.
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the UK, and Germany, the result of this research tentatively mentions that the Japanese labor
market in the first half of the 20th century was closer to the contemporary British than to
the contemporary American in terms of symmetry of informational structure for employer
learning, and closer to the contemporary American than to the contemporary German in terms
of comparative emphasis on industry- or firm- specificity of human capital investment.
To proceed such a comparative analysis, further inquiry based on panel data of employees
who work for specific firms is desired. In this sense, the literature following Lluis (2005)
that focused on employer learning and matching within internal labor markets are hoped to be
enriched, and this case study hopefully is one of them.
5.2 Learning in early stages
Table 6 also shows that negativity of coefficient of interaction between years of schooling and
tenure (yosten) enlarges as cohort goes down. It indicates that employer learning went faster
in the late periods. Since later cohorts had shorter tenure, the employer learning observed with
later cohorts show employer learning in the early years after employees joined the firm. Lluis
(2005) infers that learning effect had larger impact in earlier tenure in internal labor markets,
based on the German data.66 The result here is consistent with the inference.
5.3 Schooling, internal labor market, and dual structure
After the Second World War, the Japanese government extended mandatory schooling from
6 years to 9 years, and the number of high schools drastically increased. The explosive ex-
pansion of secondary schooling, which proceeded in the 1920s in the US, occurred in Japan
from the 1950s to the 1960s. Secondary school system in prewar Japan, introduced from Eu-
rope, was the one to train a small group of elites. It was completely transformed into massive
investment in human capital of majority people, which was a case of convergence to the Amer-
ican system of secondary education, along with convergence to the US-led technology-skill
complementary development.67
Postwar junior high schools and most of high schools have focused on general education,
not vocational education concentrating on particular and inflexible skills. The “uniquely-
American invention”68 of extended secondary school in the early 20th century was introduced
to Japan after the Second World War, accompanied with rapid increase of capital-labor ratio,
in the economic race to catch up with the US.69 It directly led to supply of higher educated
blue-collar workforce to the manufacturing sector. In despite of the rapid increase of better
educated workers, the significantly positive coefficient of postwar education dummy (psw)
on Table 4 means that return of schooling rather increased after the Second World War.70
66Lluis (2005), pp. 745-755.
67Goldin (2001), pp. 269-275. Ueshima, Funaba and Inoki (2006), pp. 72-73.
68Goldin (1998), p. 350.
69Godo and Hayami (2002), pp. 968-974.
70This is mainly because coverage of this research is up to the 1960s. An empirical study on the manufacturing
sector as a whole indicates that wage premium with graduation of high school or more hit the highest in the mid
1960s, and had gradually declined since then (Ohkusa and Ohta (1994), p. 180-181). Ueshima (2003) argues that
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It indicates that, responding to increased supply of higher-educated workforce, technology-
skill/education complementarity was augmented along with manualization of production line,
and the transition rather increased demand for more educated workers and pulled up return on
education,71 as happened in the US from the 1920s to the 1940s.72 Also, massive ivestment
in public education by the government apparently succeeded in release of the society from the
“low skill trap” equilibrium.73 As result, productivity of the Japanese manufacturing sector is
estimated to overtake the British in the 1970s, and the German in the 1980s, closing the gap
with the American though still behind.74
The Kamaishi Iron Works rode the trend and invested more in higher educated workers af-
ter the SecondWorld War, as the negative coefficient of interaction between years of schooling
and Development Center dummy (yos dc) on Table 4 mentions.
While “port of entry,” where only young workers are employed and are assigned to the
lowest ladder, is a symbolic characterizaion of internal labor market suggested by Doeringer
and Piore (1971), it is not always empirically supported.75 In the case of Japanese manufac-
turing, it became a dominant practice in the 1960s, much later than formation of internal labor
market in the 1930s. It had become a common practice of personnel management of major
firms to hire new graduates and apply internal promotion not only for white collar employees
also for blue collar employees in the 1960s,76 and on-the-job training closely linked educa-
tional background became a persistent personnel policy in Japanese firms.77 More investment
in freshmen who had just graduated high school at Kamaishi was a part of the ongoing preva-
lence.
This analysis of the micro data is consistent with the story “dual” labor market of the
Japanese manufacturing in the macroeconomic context: Better educated graduates get into
major firms, and, while internal labor markets are dominant among major factories with ad-
vanced technologies such as the Kamaishi IronWorks, it is not among small and medium sized
firms. Better education and investment in firm-specific human capital brought higher wages.
Once an employee left a major firm, he could get hired only by small or medium sized firms
with lower technology that paid worse. The quasi-rent provided employees of major firms
the educational wage differential was squeezed by rapidly increased supply of high-school graduates (Ueshima
(2003), pp. 47-48.), as it was in the US in the mid 20th century, though institutional factors had a significant role
in the US (Goldin and Margo (1992), pp. 17-32. Goldin (1999), pp. s80-s92.). As the most of a cohort came
to enrol high school by the end of the 1970s, and the educational wage differential became an issue between
college graduates and high school graduates. In the 1980s, while wage differential between college and high
school graduates rose astonishingly in the US, the rise in Japan was relatively modest (Katz and Revenga (1989),
pp. 526-535.). Katz and Revenga (1989) suggests that it was at least partly because high school graduates in
the Japanese manufacturing were better adjusted to technological changes with support from on-the-job-training
enhanced in Japanese firms (Katz and Revenga (1989), p. 545.), which is a consistent with the result that relative
importance of tenure over total experience is larger in Japan (Abe (2000), p. 264.).
71This possible story is consistent with the theoretical prediction such as Kiley (1999), pp. 712-720.
72Goldin and Katz (1998), pp. 726-727.
73Burdett and Smith (2002), p. 1450.
74Broadberry (1994), pp. 292-295.
75Doeringer and Piore (1971), pp. 43-48. Baker and Holmstrom (1995), p. 256.
76Gordon (1985), pp. 386-411. Sugayama (2011), pp. 338-443.
77Higuchi (1994), pp. 172-174.
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with strong incentives to commit to internal labor market. This structural feature is thought to
have emerged in the 1920s and had still been persistent in the 1980s.78
As manufacturing firms began to form internal labor markets with modernization effort,
the government increased investment in public education. Workers invested in general human
capital at schools and short-term employment, and in firm-specific human capital in internal
labor markets. The society-wide transition to this direction formed divided labor markets, and
this structural feature of the labor market can bee seen even in micro data.
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Table 1 Emplyee numbers, years of schooling, and previous experience across cohorts.
max min median mean max min median mean
yj1928 1 24 9 9 9 9.00 3 3 3 3.00
yj1929 1 38 8 8 8 8.00 1 1 1 1.00
yj1930 1 28 8 8 8 8.00 2 2 2 2.00
yj1931 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
yj1932 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
yj1933 3 81 8 8 8 8.00 5 2 2 2.85
yj1934 2 56 8 6 6 6.82 11 5 5 7.46
yj1935 5 141 8 8 8 8.00 9 1 1 3.96
yj1936 7 152 8 8 8 8.00 9 1 6 6.36
yj1937 7 193 8 6 8 7.75 12 1 8 6.55
yj1938 18 495 8 6 8 7.51 13 0 6 5.44
yj1939 39 1,010 9 6 8 7.91 13 0 5 5.21
yj1940 41 1,053 8 6 8 7.81 12 0 6 5.54
yj1941 44 998 9 6 8 7.85 13 0 4 4.80
yj1942 29 651 9 6 8 7.62 16 0 3 4.57
yj1943 23 522 9 6 8 7.98 14 0 2 3.87
yj1944 26 564 8 6 8 7.60 16 0 2 4.47
yj1945 17 376 8 6 8 7.77 3 0 1 0.89
yj1946 17 344 8 6 8 7.75 22 0 1 3.70
yj1947 11 203 8 6 8 7.82 3 0 1 0.98
yj1948 283 5,298 16 6 8 8.13 23 0 9 9.48
yj1949 259 4,532 15 6 8 8.09 21 0 8 8.55
yj1950 37 609 12 6 9 8.39 26 0 2 5.74
yj1951 53 857 15 6 8 7.76 21 2 9 9.36
yj1952 7 104 9 6 8 7.82 10 5 7 7.33
yj1953 13 154 12 9 9 9.16 4 0 3 2.77
yj1954 19 220 12 9 9 9.82 3 0 3 2.30
yj1955 11 122 9 9 9 9.00 3 2 3 2.88
yj1956 91 910 15 6 9 8.93 20 0 7 7.33
yj1957 69 620 15 6 9 9.08 18 0 6 6.75
yj1958 25 189 9 9 9 9.00 9 2 3 3.10
yj1959 87 586 12 8 9 10.05 15 0 3 3.83
yj1960 47 250 12 9 9 10.11 28 0 3 4.84
yj1961 35 148 12 9 9 9.16 12 1 3 3.82
yj1962 84 279 12 8 12 10.70 9 0 2 1.92
yj1963 41 71 15 6 8 8.70 35 2 20 19.51
yj1964 15 71 15 6 8 8.70 35 2 20 19.51
yj1965 9 29 12 8 12 10.72 5 1 1 2.28
yj1966 10 20 12 12 12 12.00 2 0 1 0.95
yj1967 8 15 12 9 9 10.20 14 1 5 7.40
total 1,495 22,013
Notes : Previous experience: Years after graduating school, before employed by the firm.
Number
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Table 2 Cohort effect in panel estimations.
2-1 2-2
Estimation method panel least squares
Dependent variable log(rw)
Cross-section pooled (no cross-section dummy)
Period (year) fixed (year dummies inserted)
Indepedent variables coefficient t  statistic probability coefficient t statistic probability
c -0.3643 -18.0062 0.0000 -0.2349 -9.7127 0.0000
log(yos) 0.1785 26.2363 0.0000 0.1828 27.1514 0.0000
log(epr) 0.2175 85.1986 0.0000 0.2444 84.4775 0.0000
log(ten) 0.0356 13.1963 0.0000
yj1928-1929 0.6802 30.3373 0.0000 -0.1048 -1.4048 0.1601
yj1930-1931 0.6972 25.1817 0.0000 -0.0351 -0.4159 0.6775
yj1932-1933 0.6147 30.7214 0.0000 -0.0795 -1.2426 0.2140
yj1934-1935 0.6670 39.1088 0.0000 -0.0924 -1.6770 0.0936
yj1936-1937 0.6295 40.1487 0.0000 -0.0815 -1.6164 0.1060
yj1938-1939 0.6341 44.3434 0.0000 -0.0899 -1.9786 0.0479
yj1940-1941 0.5896 42.3080 0.0000 -0.0898 -2.1161 0.0343
yj1942-1943 0.5479 39.5355 0.0000 -0.0658 -1.6606 0.0968
yj1944-1945 0.4828 35.2916 0.0000 -0.0991 -2.6911 0.0071
yj1946-1947 0.4485 32.4434 0.0000 -0.1235 -3.5827 0.0003
yj1948-1949 0.4336 34.2090 0.0000 -0.0557 -1.8772 0.0605
yj1950-1951 0.3628 28.6223 0.0000 -0.0817 -2.9965 0.0027
yj1952-1953 0.3265 23.1302 0.0000 -0.0431 -1.5500 0.1212
yj1954-1955 0.3004 22.3837 0.0000 -0.0033 -0.1311 0.8957
yj1956-1957 0.1744 14.5807 0.0000 -0.1139 -5.9023 0.0000
yj1958-1959 0.1253 10.3818 0.0000 -0.0738 -4.1333 0.0000
yj1960-1961 0.0865 6.8358 0.0000 -0.0634 -3.4739 0.0005
yj1962-1963 0.1120 9.0093 0.0000 0.0287 1.5465 0.1220
yj1964-1965 0.0081 0.5814 0.5610 -0.0077 -0.2447 0.8067
yj1966-1967 0.1772 7.5325 0.0000 0.2381 3.6260 0.0003
yj1928-1929×log(ten) 0.0214 8.8438 0.0000
yj1930-1931×log(ten) 0.0198 6.2121 0.0000
yj1932-1933×log(ten) 0.0218 9.7056 0.0000
yj1934-1935×log(ten) 0.0269 13.8477 0.0000
yj1936-1937×log(ten) 0.0267 14.7740 0.0000
yj1938-1939×log(ten) 0.0306 18.0433 0.0000
yj1940-1941×log(ten) 0.0309 18.2999 0.0000
yj1942-1943×log(ten) 0.0301 17.4422 0.0000
yj1944-1945×log(ten) 0.0318 18.0134 0.0000
yj1946-1947×log(ten) 0.0360 19.1470 0.0000
yj1948-1949×log(ten) 0.0338 20.2743 0.0000
yj1950-1951×log(ten) 0.0357 19.9709 0.0000
yj1952-1953×log(ten) 0.0342 13.8339 0.0000
yj1954-1955×log(ten) 0.0322 13.3066 0.0000
yj1956-1957×log(ten) 0.0398 20.4086 0.0000
yj1958-1959×log(ten) 0.0363 14.3649 0.0000
yj1960-1961×log(ten) 0.0349 9.4968 0.0000
yj1962-1963×log(ten) 0.0242 4.4991 0.0000
yj1964-1965×log(ten) 0.0322 3.2872 0.0010
yj1966-1967×log(ten) 0.0197 0.6700 0.5029
year dummies yes yes
cross-sections included 1,490 1,490
periods included (years) 41 (1929-1969) 41 (1929-1969)
included observations 22,045 22,045
adjusted R2 0.9622 0.9631
F statistic 8,911.6042 0.0000 7,016.7697 0.0000
Table 3 Cohort effect on wage curves
3-1
Estimation method panel generalized least squares
Dependent variable log(rwten)
Cross-section random effect
Period (year) pooled (no year dummies inserted)
Indepedent variables coefficient t statistic probability
c 0.5993 42.1125 0.0000
log(yos) 0.0835 8.8833 0.0000
1st lagged yj1928-1929×log(rwten-1) 0.3635 17.8422 0.0000
yj1930-1931×log(rwten-1) 0.6119 10.0973 0.0000
yj1932-1933×log(rwten-1) 0.6430 24.5980 0.0000
yj1934-1935×log(rwten-1) 0.6212 33.6226 0.0000
yj1936-1937×log(rwten-1) 0.6181 36.7199 0.0000
yj1938-1939×log(rwten-1) 0.5742 63.8623 0.0000
yj1940-1941×log(rwten-1) 0.5153 67.5934 0.0000
yj1942-1943×log(rwten-1) 0.5256 49.6591 0.0000
yj1944-1945×log(rwten-1) 0.4692 43.8440 0.0000
yj1946-1947×log(rwten-1) 0.4556 29.9910 0.0000
yj1948-1949×log(rwten-1) 0.4487 55.3832 0.0000
yj1950-1951×log(rwten-1) 0.3405 18.5565 0.0000
yj1952-1953×log(rwten-1) 0.2978 7.1952 0.0000
yj1954-1955×log(rwten-1) 0.2119 4.9534 0.0000
yj1956-1957×log(rwten-1) 0.4365 17.5345 0.0000
yj1958-1959×log(rwten-1) 0.4276 8.1555 0.0000
yj1960-1961×log(rwten-1) 0.4406 6.8294 0.0000
yj1962-1963×log(rwten-1) 0.2941 4.2683 0.0000
yj1964-1965×log(rwten-1) 0.3635 4.6177 0.0000
yj1966-1967×log(rwten-1) 0.1089 0.4172 0.6765
2nd lagged yj1928-1929×log(rwten-2) 0.3057 14.3565 0.0000
yj1930-1931×log(rwten-2) 0.1016 1.6119 0.1070
yj1932-1933×log(rwten-2) 0.0178 0.6614 0.5084
yj1934-1935×log(rwten-2) 0.0597 3.1417 0.0017
yj1936-1937×log(rwten-2) 0.0553 3.2076 0.0013
yj1938-1939×log(rwten-2) 0.0951 10.7417 0.0000
yj1940-1941×log(rwten-2) 0.1457 19.2960 0.0000
yj1942-1943×log(rwten-2) 0.1268 11.8695 0.0000
yj1944-1945×log(rwten-2) 0.1687 15.5359 0.0000
yj1946-1947×log(rwten-2) 0.1729 11.7346 0.0000
yj1948-1949×log(rwten-2) 0.1814 24.2104 0.0000
yj1950-1951×log(rwten-2) 0.2669 14.3601 0.0000
yj1952-1953×log(rwten-2) 0.2756 6.3033 0.0000
yj1954-1955×log(rwten-2) 0.3388 7.4659 0.0000
yj1956-1957×log(rwten-2) 0.0674 2.5942 0.0095
yj1958-1959×log(rwten-2) -0.0006 -0.0098 0.9922
yj1960-1961×log(rwten-2) -0.0541 -0.7810 0.4348
yj1962-1963×log(rwten-2) 0.0200 0.2639 0.7918
yj1964-1965×log(rwten-2) -0.1670 -1.8511 0.0642
yj1966-1967×log(rwten-2) 0.3378 1.0892 0.2761
interaction of year dummy and yos: dy×yos yes
cross-sections included 1,433
periods included (years) 39 (1931-1969)
included observations 19,066
adjusted R2 0.9725
F statistic 8,537.2225 0.0000
Table 4 Wage regressions: indvidul effects of in-house trainng programs.
4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4
Estimation method panel generalized least squares
Dependent variable log(rw)
Cross-section random effect
Period (year) pooled (no year dummies inserted)
Indepedent variables coefficient t  statistic probability coefficient t statistic probability coefficient t statistic probability coefficient t statistic probability
c -4.4206 -49.4743 0.0000 -6.7700 -46.2059 0.0000 -16.5632 -27.1311 0.0000 -11.0425 -10.0826 0.0000
log(hgt) 2.4108 19.3716 0.0000 0.7652 3.3674 0.0008
log(yos) 1.6045 39.8490 0.0000 2.6959 40.0987 0.0000 1.5915 43.3703 0.0000 2.8583 41.6628 0.0000
psw 0.4504 45.3885 0.0000 0.3973 39.9456 0.0000 0.3858 38.6450 0.0000 0.3645 36.4727 0.0000
log(epr) 0.4876 67.0161 0.0000 2.0288 26.3525 0.0000 0.3922 47.7746 0.0000 -2.8090 -4.2099 0.0000
log(ten) 1.4919 40.2076 0.0000 0.6148 10.7650 0.0000 6.5071 25.4012 0.0000 7.9548 16.9729 0.0000
log(hgt)×log(epr) 0.9674 7.1277 0.0000
log(hgt)×log(ten) -0.9496 -18.3988 0.0000 -1.4063 -14.9899 0.0000
log(yos)×log(epr) -0.7241 -20.1249 0.0000 -0.7811 -21.7663 0.0000
log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1173 -4.3037 0.0000 -0.5635 -37.1927 0.0000 -0.1581 -6.5884 0.0000
dcy -0.4035 -3.4469 0.0006 -0.3557 -19.6829 0.0000 -0.2755 -2.9906 0.0028 -0.3143 -3.4693 0.0005
dcy×log(ten) 0.1640 3.3196 0.0009 0.1547 20.2078 0.0000 0.1046 2.7320 0.0063 0.1167 3.0809 0.0021
sy -0.3545 -19.3835 0.0000 -0.4288 -3.7114 0.0002 -0.2859 -18.8036 0.0000 -0.2860 -19.1205 0.0000
sy×log(ten) 0.1529 19.8530 0.0000 0.1742 3.5556 0.0004 0.1066 17.2821 0.0000 0.1061 17.3921 0.0000
dct -0.2782 -8.4644 0.0000 -0.2607 -8.0229 0.0000 -0.1861 -5.5985 0.0000 -0.2033 -6.2165 0.0000
dct×log(ten) 0.0861 6.5971 0.0000 0.0834 6.4294 0.0000 0.0827 6.1054 0.0000 0.0872 6.5091 0.0000
dc 0.2875 16.9174 0.0000 0.3410 20.0529 0.0000 0.3885 28.3333 0.0000 0.4665 33.4297 0.0000
dc×log(ten) -0.1194 -14.9293 0.0000 -0.1311 -16.5164 0.0000 -0.2084 -31.7769 0.0000 -0.2280 -34.8976 0.0000
cross-sections included 1,495 1,495 1,190 1,190
periods included (years) 41(1929-1969) 41(1929-1969) 31(1939-1969) 31(1939-1969)
included observations 22,126 22,126 15,774 15,774
adjusted R2 0.7153 0.7179 0.8495 0.8530
F statistic 4,276.9504 0.0000 4,023.7014 0.0000 5,937.5240 5,385.5983 0.0000
5-1
Estimation method panel generalized least squares
Dependent variable log(rw)
Cross-section random effect
Period (year) pooled (no year dummies inserted)
Indepedent variables coefficient t statistic probability
Table 5 Interaction of schooling previous epxerience/tenure: without conrol of
cohort effects.
c 0.3202 5.4213 0.0000
log(yos) 0.3673 13.2674 0.0000
log(pvr) -0.0588 -2.1843 0.0290
log(ten) 0.7052 47.9549 0.0000
log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0684 5.4487 0.0000
log(yos)×log(ten) -0.2185 -31.8333 0.0000
interaction of year dummy and yos: dy×yos yes
cross-sections included 1,490
periods included (years) 41(1929-1969)
included observations 22,045
adjusted R2 0.9545
F statistic 10,279.0237 0.0000
6-1
Estimation method panel generalized least squares
Dependent variable log(rw)
Cross-section random effect
Period (year) pooled (no year dummies inserted)
Indepedent variables coefficient t statistic probability
c 0.2786 7.5211 0.0000
log(yos) 0.4701 26.6533 0.0000
log(pvr) -0.0552 -7.0511 0.0000
log(ten) 0.3021 25.7110 0.0000
yj1928-1929×log(yos)×log(pvr) -0.0762 -2.1206 0.0340
yj1930-1931×log(yos)×log(pvr) -0.0721 -1.1802 0.2379
yj1932-1933×log(yos)×log(pvr) -0.0547 -2.3141 0.0207
yj1934-1935×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0394 3.8687 0.0001
yj1936-1937×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0647 8.3687 0.0000
yj1938-1939×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0679 12.9928 0.0000
yj1940-1941×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0725 15.1548 0.0000
yj1942-1943×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0878 17.3301 0.0000
yj1944-1945×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0751 13.4498 0.0000
yj1946-1947×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0698 10.9268 0.0000
yj1948-1949×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.1052 29.0775 0.0000
yj1950-1951×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0911 22.8328 0.0000
yj1952-1953×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.1001 15.9854 0.0000
yj1954-1955×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0917 14.0185 0.0000
yj1956-1957×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0608 16.6241 0.0000
yj1958-1959×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0392 9.5487 0.0000
yj1960-1961×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0353 7.9487 0.0000
yj1962-1963×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0168 3.1449 0.0017
yj1964-1965×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0702 11.4393 0.0000
yj1966-1967×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0443 5.0681 0.0000
tenure yj1928-1929×log(yos)×log(ten) 0.0441 3.3562 0.0008
yj1930-1931×log(yos)×log(ten) 0.0421 1.9443 0.0519
yj1932-1933×log(yos)×log(ten) 0.0366 3.3057 0.0009
yj1934-1935×log(yos)×log(ten) 0.0087 1.1667 0.2433
yj1936-1937×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0118 -1.7443 0.0811
yj1938-1939×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0095 -1.6184 0.1056
yj1940-1941×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0193 -3.3376 0.0008
yj1942-1943×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0316 -5.4193 0.0000
yj1944-1945×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0318 -5.4001 0.0000
yj1946-1947×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0343 -5.6775 0.0000
yj1948-1949×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0732 -13.2852 0.0000
yj1950-1951×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0726 -12.7004 0.0000
yj1952-1953×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0931 -13.9681 0.0000
yj1954-1955×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0943 -15.2773 0.0000
yj1956-1957×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0914 -16.3870 0.0000
yj1958-1959×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1022 -17.7993 0.0000
yj1960-1961×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1132 -17.7019 0.0000
yj1962-1963×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1106 -16.0659 0.0000
yj1964-1965×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0777 -8.1543 0.0000
yj1966-1967×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1435 -9.5139 0.0000
dcy, sy, dct, dc yes
dcy×log(ten), sy×log(ten), dct×log(ten), dc×log(ten) yes
interaction of year dummy and yos: dy×yos yes
cross-sections included 1,490
periods included (years) 41(1929-1969)
included observations 22,045
adjusted R2 0.9652
F statistic 6,717.5996 0.0000
previous
experience
Table 6 Interaction of schooling and previous epxerience/tenure: robustness check with control of
cohort and other effects.
Appendix List of variables.
variable definition
rw real daily wage.
hgt height when employed by the firm.
yos years of schooling.
psw postwar education generation (12 years old or younger in 1947). dummy variable
epr experience in the labor market: age−(5+yos)+1.
pve previous experience: age−(5+yos+ten)+1.  Note: Every sample
emolyee was hired by the firm in the last year of his record.
yj19XX dummy of year joined: =1 if joined the firm in 19XX. dummy variable
yj19XX-19YY dummy of year joined: =1 ifjoined the firm from 19XX to 19YY. dummy variable
dy19XX year dammy. dummy variable
ten tenure: (years after employed by the firm)+1.
dcy 1 if completed Development Center for Youth (from 1927 to 1935dummy variable
sy 1 if completed School for Youth (from 1935 to 1948). dummy variable
dct 1 if completed Development Center for Technician (from 1939 to dummy variable
dc 1 if completed Development Center (from 1946 to 1973). dummy variable
